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


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Professor Richard Capobianco Publishes His Second Book on Heidegger

October 1, 2014



Richard Capobianco

There are few better college learning experiences than studying a topic with the person considered to be a leading authority on the material.

Stonehill students in [Professor Richard Capobianco's](#) philosophy course on the seminal 20th-century philosopher Martin Heidegger have such an experience. And they'll soon have a new resource to guide them: Capobianco's "Heidegger's Way of Being" releases Oct. 6.


"One of the great pleasures of teaching at Stonehill is that I have the privilege of teaching courses that concern my research ... I've been teaching a Heidegger course since I came to the College almost 30 years ago, and I love teaching today as much as I did when I started," said Capobianco, who teaches philosophy courses at all levels. His 2010 book "Engaging Heidegger" received superb critical reviews and has become a widely read and influential book in the field.

"It's terrific that students are able to read my books as part of the course," says Capobianco, who has won three teaching awards, including being named one of

"The Best 300 Professors" by the Princeton Review in 2012. "As the author, I can bring to students a sense of the excitement of the intellectual life and of the lively conversation that scholars have with each other beyond the borders of the campus. I can share with them the interesting questions and comments I receive when I give a lecture or attend a conference elsewhere. Students come to recognize that they are involved in this larger conversation, too, and this engages them all the more."

Former student Andrew Bourret '09 says he found Capobianco's enthusiasm infectious. "It was obvious that Professor Capobianco was passionate about the topic," he says. "He would speak with great enthusiasm — eyes wide with excitement, and arms and fingertips extended — whenever he was about to discuss some new idea."

Passing the Torch of Knowledge



Capobianco first became interested in Heidegger as an undergrad philosophy student.

He says he fell so in love with philosophy and with studying Heidegger's thoughts that he changed his plans for law school to pursue a doctoral degree in philosophy instead. "In graduate school, I was fortunate to have studied with one of Heidegger's foremost students and an important 20th-century philosopher in his own right, Hans-Georg Gadamer, as well as with William J. Richardson, the renowned Heidegger scholar, who was my mentor," he said.

"Studying Heidegger with such masterful thinkers and scholars was extraordinarily exciting and inspiring," he said. He recalled visiting Richardson to discuss Heidegger's philosophy for hours.

"He would also regale me with vivid stories of his time in Germany and of his visits with Heidegger," he said. "In turn, I like to tell my students the stories about my experiences with these great scholars and of my visits

to Heidegger's home region in the vicinity of the Black Forest in Germany."

The student is now the teacher, as the saying goes, and now that Capobianco is a leading Heidegger scholar himself, he hopes to pass the torch of knowledge and to inspire his own students as much as his professors inspired him.

"Philosophy affords the simple and pure delight of thinking," he said. "If I can communicate some of that joy to my students, and if they can come away having experienced some of that joy for themselves, then all is well."

[Publisher's page for "Heidegger's Way of Being."](#)

[Read more about Andrew Bourret '09 and his experience studying Heidegger with Professor Richard Capobianco.](#)



3 MAY/14

This week in *The New Yorker*, Joshua Rothman [writes](#) about the recent scandal over Heidegger's antisemitism and reports on the recent discussion at the Goethe Institute between myself; Babette Babich, Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University; and Peter Trawny, director of the Martin Heidegger Institute at the University of Wuppertal. Trawny has just edited three volumes of Heidegger's *Black Notebooks*, philosophical notebooks Heidegger kept from 1931-1941. In these notebooks Heidegger works out his ideas of what he calls a "spiritual National Socialism" which he distinguishes from a "vulgar National Socialism." He also, in the years from 1936-1941 discusses the Jews on about 10 pages (out of 1,200) and unquestionably trades in antisemitic stereotypes, referring to the Jews as worldless and homeless; in one entry, Heidegger writes of a Jewish world conspiracy. Alongside these edited volumes, Trawny has published a slim companion volume, *Heidegger and the Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy*. In it, Trawny seeks to evaluate Heidegger's antisemitism and to ask to what extent that antisemitism contaminates Heidegger's philosophy.

In the *New Yorker*, Rothman begins by recounting his own magical encounter with Heidegger's texts.

If I had to rate the best intellectual experiences of my life, choosing the two or three most profound—a tendentious task, but there you are—one of them would be reading Heidegger. I was in my late twenties, and struggling with a dissertation on the nature of consciousness (what it is, where it comes from, how it fits into the material world). This had turned out to be an impossible subject. Everything I read succeeded only by narrowing the world, imagining it to be either a material or a spiritual place—never both.

Then, in the course of a year, I read Heidegger's 1927 masterwork, "Being and Time," along with "The

Essence of Truth," a book based on a series of lectures that Heidegger gave in 1932. It was as if, having been trapped on the ground floor of a building, I had found an express elevator to the roof, from which I could see the stars. Heidegger had developed his own way of describing the nature of human existence. It wasn't religious, and it wasn't scientific; it got its arms around everything, from rocks to the soul. Instead of subjects and objects, Heidegger wanted to talk about "beings." The world, he argued, is full of beings—numbers, oceans, mountains, animals—but human beings are the only ones who care about what it means to be themselves. (A human being, he writes, is the "entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue.") This gives us depth. Mountains might outlast us, but they can't out-be us. For Heidegger, human being was an activity, with its own unique qualities, for which he had invented names: thrownness, fallenness, projection. These words, for him, captured the way that we try, amidst the flow of time, to "take a stand" on what it means to exist. (Thus the title: "Being and Time.")

In "The Essence of Truth," meanwhile, Heidegger proposed a different and, to my mind, a more realistic idea of truth than any I'd encountered before. He believed that, before you could know the truth about things, you had to care about them. Caring comes first, because it's caring about things that "unconceals" them in your day-to-day life, so that they can be known about. If you don't care about things, they stay "hidden"—and, because there are limits to our care, to be alive is "to be surrounded by the hidden." (A century's worth of intellectual history has flowed from this insight: that caring and not caring about things has a history, and that this history shapes our thinking.) This is a humble way to think about truth. It acknowledges that, while we claim to "know" about a lot of things intellectually, we usually seek and know

the deeper truth about only a few. Put another way: truth is as much about what we allow ourselves to experience as it is about what we know.

Rothman's account of Heidegger as well as his report of the way Heidegger's thinking can captivate and enthral, will be familiar to many readers (and admittedly quite foreign to others who've given up on Heidegger's challenging texts). It is worth noting how welcome and even strange Rothman's sympathetic account is amongst the onslaught of holier-than-thou condemnation by columnists and opinion writers who have never read Heidegger. Even as Rothman will go on to give an account of the conversation that is, at the very least, quixotic and certainly one-sided, his testament to the worthiness of reading Heidegger is genuine.



Joshua Rothman

Heidegger's thinking explores the sense of what it means to be human. "The being of beings is not itself a being," writes in the basic statement of what he calls the ontological Heidegger difference. That may sound strange, but the thought is simple: the answer to what a cat is not some other being. 'Catness' is the indefinable way that cats are in the world, what they mean, that cannot be reduced to other worldly things. So, too, for human beings. Heidegger insists that the way of being human can not be understood as some-being (humans are rational animals or humans are beings made in the image of God or humans are social animals). Humans matter in ways different from the being and significance of other things. Specifically, human beings are those beings that in thinking transcend their individual existence and stand out in a thoughtful world. Humans are only human insofar as they act in world in which they express their human ability to think and ask after their humanity. Being human has no end, it is a way of being along the path of thinking.

Heidegger worried that humans too often forget this meaningful difference and treat humans as mere things, as simply means to greater ends. While this has always been so, it is especially true in the modern age, the age in which all beings, including human beings, are increasingly viewed and valued only for their usefulness.

Consider, for example, the Mississippi River. You probably have never had the opportunity to walk along the Mississippi or another river whose ebb and flow, whose meanderings and curves, and whose depths and eddies recall the mysteries of our own lives, the

winding and unpredictable course by which we make our way. But what is the Mississippi River? It is today, a waterway of commerce. Or it is a garbage dump for PCB's. We can make it part of the tourist industry by cleaning it up and making it safe for fish and people to swim in. We talk of diverting it, damming it, or getting rid of it entirely. Can we even experience the Mississippi as a river, a powerful, living, natural body of water? Can we simply ask: What is the river?



Mississippi River

Heidegger answers that increasingly the answer is No. The Mississippi is today a human creation, even to the extent we decide to let it be or restore it to its "natural" condition. To look at the river today is to look at something that we create. The river has lost its ability to stand on its own; it stands only at our service, at our disposal, and for our pleasure. It has lost its ability to awe us and overwhelm us. When it bursts its banks or overwhelms our barriers, our response is anger and resolve to better control it. The river is nothing in itself, and exists only to serve our myriad ends.

Heidegger's analysis of the Mississippi applies to human beings as well. What are human beings today? We are human resources, to be maximized and organized. We educate human beings so that they can be productive. We care for them so that they live comfortably and cost less to care for later. Human capital is only one form of capital amongst others, but it requires intense management and care to be efficiently managed. Of course, when a dam is needed, humans may need to be uprooted and moved. Certain dangerous humans need to be medicated. And other violent humans can be tempered by implants in their brains. In times of disorder, humans must be restrained; in times of sickness they may need to be culled; and in times of war they may need to be eliminated. In short, humans are increasingly treated and acted upon as resources just as things. Which is one reason we have such difficulty thinking about the study of the humanities outside of questions of utility. In another vein, Heidegger's philosophy offers one of truly meaningful defenses of the dignity of humanity that might provide a ground for human rights.

It is thus all the more surprising and shocking that Heidegger was an unapologetic Nazi and an antisemite. He never abandoned his belief in what he called a spiritual National Socialism, something he distinguished from vulgar National Socialism, even as he worked for and supported the actual Nazi Party in 1933. Heidegger abandoned many of his Jewish friends and employed antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices; he did this even

as he helped to defend and even save other Jews. The question has long hung over his thinking however: To what extent, if at all, do his racist views impact his larger thinking?

The *Black Notebooks* and Trawny's monograph have made waves in the press because he has argued, or at least suggested, that Heidegger's antisemitism "contaminates" his larger philosophical project. On the one hand, Trawny argues that Heidegger's antisemitism is neither racial nor biological, and that it was far different from Nazi antisemitism:

He [Heidegger] had concealed his antisemitism from the Nazi's themselves. Why? Because he was of the opinion, that his antisemitism was different from that of the Nazis. That is certainly right. Nevertheless—care is recommended here.

—Peter Trawny, *Heidegger und der Mythos der Jüdischen Weltverschwörung* (Heidegger and the Myth of Jewish World Conspiracy), 15-16

Along these lines, Trawny writes that Heidegger's antisemitism was developed and articulated in connection with his philosophical project of a historical development of being:

All that binds Heidegger with National Socialism is rooted in the narrative of the "first beginning" with the Greeks and the "other beginning" with the Germans. This story forms the ground on which Heidegger welcomes the "national Revolution" and puts himself in its service. With this story he bound himself to an "intellectual and spiritual National Socialism," which he early on distinguished from a "vulgar National Socialism."

—Peter Trawny, *Heidegger und der Mythos der Jüdischen Weltverschwörung* (Heidegger and the Myth of Jewish World Conspiracy), 28


And yet, Trawny concludes that it is likely that Heidegger's philosophy is implicated in his antisemitic views. It is, ironically, the fact that Heidegger's antisemitism was intellectual rather than racial that, for Trawny, suggests it may in fact contaminate his philosophy:

In other words we must ask: How should we proceed with Heidegger's being-historical antisemitism in relation to the Shoah? It is no longer open to debate whether Heidegger's "political error" ought to be defended (if that is possible) against a "politically correct" and thus intentionally or unintentionally distorting public debate. There is antisemitism in Heidegger's thinking that—as corresponds to a thinker—receives a (impossible) philosophic ground. But this antisemitism of Heidegger's does not go beyond two or three stereotypes. The being-historical construction makes it however worse. The being-historical construction can lead to a contamination of Heidegger's thinking.

—Peter Trawny, *Heidegger und der Mythos der Jüdischen Weltverschwörung* (Heidegger and the Myth of Jewish World Conspiracy), 93.

The problem with Trawny's argument is that there is no evidence whatsoever that Heidegger's philosophical discussion of worldlessness and homelessness in his history of being has its roots in his antisemitism. On the contrary, Heidegger traces the emergence of worldlessness and homelessness to the birth of modern science in the work of René Descartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. At times, Heidegger even traces this development back to Plato and the beginning of Western philosophy. In the modern era, Heidegger points to Americans, the English, Bolsheviks, and Nazis

as examples of such worldlessness and homelessness. All of these groups receive more attention in the *Black Notebooks* than do the Jews. The argument that because antisemitism often sees Jews as worldless and homeless then they must be the source of Heidegger's philosophical interest in homelessness and worldlessness simply makes no sense. And Trawny came close to taking back his statement about contamination in the discussion. He even admitted that he may have to revise that claim in the second edition of his book.



Pages from one of Martin Heidegger's "black notebooks" from 1931 to 1941. *The New York Times*

The packed audience at the Goethe Institute and the parade of essays online and in the *New Yorker* shows that the Heidegger question is not a mere academic debate. It is, in the end, about our willingness to read and engage with important ideas. Heidegger was a Nazi and he was an antisemite. That doesn't discredit his thinking.

Watch the conversation between Peter Trawny and Roger Berkowitz [here](#) - <https://vimeo.com/93670604>. Watch the panel discussion between Peter Trawny and Babette Babich, moderated by Roger Berkowitz, [here](#) - <http://vimeo.com/93782805>. They are well worth your time. These videos are your weekend read.

*During the discussion, we projected slides with quotations from Heidegger's *Black Notebooks* on a screen, so people in the audience would have access to the words themselves. I provide below translations to four quotations from Heidegger's *Black Notebooks*, officially titled *Überlegungen*, or *Reflections*. It will be helpful to have them before your while viewing the talks.*

Jewry's temporary increase in power is, however, grounded in the fact that Western metaphysics, especially in its modern development, creates the starting point for the diffusion of a generally empty rationality and calculating capacity, which in this way provides a refuge in "Geist," without being able grasp from out of itself the hidden regions-of-decision [Entscheidungsbezirke]. The more original and captured-in-their beginning anfänglicher the prospective decisions and questions, the more they remain inaccessible to this "race."

—Martin Heidegger, *Überlegungen XII*, 67. GA 96, 46.
The Jews, with their marked gift for calculating, "live" already for the longest time according to the principle of race, which is why they are resisting its consistent application with utmost violence. The establishment

[Einrichtung] of racial breeding does not stem from "life" itself, but from the overpowering of life through Machenschaft [Technik]. What [Machenschaft and racial breeding] pushes forward with such a plan is the complete deracialization of all peoples by constricting of them into a uniformly constructed and tailored institution [Einrichtung] of all beings. At one with de-racialization is the self-alienation of peoples – the loss of history – i.e., the decision-regions of being.

—Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen XII, 84-85, v. 96, p. 56.

Also the idea of an understanding with England in terms of a distribution of imperialist "prerogatives" misses the essence of the historical process, which is lead by England within the framework of Americanism and Bolshevism and at the same time world Jewry to its final conclusion. The question of the role of world Jewry is not racial, but the metaphysical question of the type of humanity that can accept the world-historical "task" of uprooting all beings from Being.

—Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen, XIV, 121, v. 96, 243.

World Jewry, incited by emigrants allowed to leave Germany, is pervasive and impalpable, and even though its power is widely spread, it doesn't need to participate in military actions, whereas all that remains to us is to sacrifice the best blood of our own people.

—Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen XV, 17, v. 96, 262.



Roger Berkowitz

Roger Berkowitz is Associate Professor of Political Studies and Human Rights at Bard College, and Academic Director of the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and the Humanities. He is also the author of "Gift of Science: Leibniz and the Modern Legal Tradition", as well as co-editor of "Thinking in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt on Ethics and Politics"

Comment:

[Fredrick Toben](#)

September 28th, 2014 - 05:00

>Heidegger was a Nazi and he was an antisemite. That doesn't discredit his thinking.<

What a splendid philosophical comment, and in our current era of PC it is almost revolutionary. It makes you a real Heideggerian scholar who is about to jettison those tired and worn out concepts of "Nazi" and "antisemite", and thereby enabling the enquiring mind to move beyond such imposed intellectual constraints.

Congratulations.

<http://www.hannaharendtcenter.org/?p=13063#comment-379678>

Is Heidegger Contaminated by Nazism?

BY [JOSHUA ROTHMAN](#), APRIL 28, 2014



Martin Heidegger, circa 1950.

If I had to rate the best intellectual experiences of my life, choosing the two or three most profound—a tendentious task, but there you are—one of them would be reading Heidegger. I was in my late twenties, and struggling with a dissertation on the nature of consciousness (what it is, where it comes from, how it fits into the material world). This had turned out to be an impossible subject. Everything I read succeeded

only by narrowing the world, imagining it to be either a material or a spiritual place—never both.

Then, in the course of a year, I read Heidegger's 1927 masterwork, "Being and Time," along with "The Essence of Truth," a book based on a series of lectures that Heidegger gave in 1932. It was as if, having been trapped on the ground floor of a building, I had found an express elevator to the roof, from which I could see the stars. Heidegger had developed his own way of describing the nature of human existence. It wasn't religious, and it wasn't scientific; it got its arms around everything, from rocks to the soul. Instead of subjects and objects, Heidegger wanted to talk about "beings." The world, he argued, is full of beings—numbers, oceans, mountains, animals—but human beings are the only ones who care about what it means to be themselves. (A human being, he writes, is the "entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue.") This gives us depth. Mountains might outlast us, but they can't out-be us. For Heidegger, human being was an activity, with its own unique qualities, for which he had invented names: *thrownness, fallenness, projection*. These words, for him, captured the way that we try, amidst the flow of time, to "take a stand" on what it means to exist. (Thus the title: "Being and Time.") In "The Essence of Truth," meanwhile, Heidegger proposed a different and, to my mind, a more realistic idea of truth than any I'd encountered before. He believed that, before you could know the truth about things, you had to care about them. Caring comes first, because it's caring about things that "unconceals" them

in your day-to-day life, so that they can be known about. If you don't care about things, they stay "hidden"—and, because there are limits to our care, to be alive is "to be surrounded by the hidden." (A century's worth of intellectual history has flowed from this insight: that caring and not caring about things has a history, and that this history shapes our thinking.) This is a humble way to think about truth. It acknowledges that, while we claim to "know" about a lot of things intellectually, we usually seek and know the deeper truth about only a few. Put another way: truth is as much about what we allow ourselves to experience as it is about what we know.

When I read Heidegger's books, I "knew"—but didn't particularly care—that he had been a Nazi. (He joined the party in 1933, the year after giving the lectures behind "The Essence of Truth.") I was so fascinated by his philosophy that his Nazism stayed "hidden"; though his ideas felt vivid and present, his biography belonged to the past. But, over the past few months, not caring has become more difficult. That's largely because of a philosophy professor named Peter Trawny, who has begun publishing some of Heidegger's anti-Semitic writings. Trawny is the director of the Martin Heidegger Institute at the University of Wuppertal, in Germany, and the editor of Heidegger's "black notebooks," some of which were published for the first time this spring. (Heidegger wrote in the small, black-covered notebooks for nearly forty years—publishing them all could take decades.)

It's always been safe to assume that Heidegger, being a Nazi, was also an anti-Semite (though not necessarily a "virulent" one, whatever that term might mean). But, as my colleague Richard Brody wrote a few weeks ago, the passages reveal a particularly unsettling kind of anti-Semitism—one which hasn't been fully visible before. They show that, even as Heidegger held the most banal and ignorant anti-Semitic beliefs (he wrote about a worldwide conspiracy of "calculating" Jews "unfurl[ing] its influence"), he also tried to formulate a special, philosophical, and even Heideggerian kind of anti-Semitism. (Jews, he writes, are "uprooted from Being-in-the World"—that is, incapable of authentically caring and knowing.) The passages, some of which were written during the Second World War, account for only a few pages out of more than a thousand. But they have alarmed and disgusted Heideggerians because they show that Heidegger himself had no trouble using his own philosophy for anti-Semitic ends. Philosophy has a math-like quality: it's not just a vocabulary, but a system. A failure in one part of the system can suggest a failure everywhere. And so, earlier this year, in a book called "Heidegger and the Myth of Jewish World Conspiracy," Trawny asked the inevitable question: could Heidegger's philosophy as a whole be "contaminated" by Nazism?

When Trawny came to New York, during the second week of April, for a panel on Heidegger and Nazism hosted by the Goethe Institute, in the East Village, all sorts of Heideggerians, from the casual to the committed, came to hear him speak. The general rule seemed to be that the more time you'd spent thinking about Heidegger, the more unnerved you were by the controversy. Relaxed, curious undergrads gathered near the sunlit windows at the back of the audience. (One couple had their arms around each other,

apparently on a date.) Further up, the grad students, in their too-old or too-young outfits, looked alert and inquisitive: for them, this was an issue of professional interest. A few rows on, an explosion of gray marked where the older professors huddled together. And at the front sat the panelists: Trawny, along with two American professors of philosophy, Roger Berkowitz and Babette Babich, from Bard and Fordham, respectively. Outside, it was spring. Inside, it was dim, airless, and funereal.

Because Trawny was from Germany, no one knew what he would be like in person—an incomprehensible hermeneutist? A cool judge of history? He turned out to be a tall, disarming man of fifty who sounded less like a judge than a disappointed lover. In a soft German accent, he explained what it had been like to read the notebooks for the first time. "Of course, you have passages about Hölderlin, about Nietzsche, about Bolshevism," he said—the usual Heideggerian subjects. "But then, suddenly, a passage about the Jews.... You think, Okay, whatever.... And then suddenly you have the second, and you have the third, and you have the fourth, and you have the sixth, and you think, What the hell! Why is he doing this?" As a lifelong Heideggerian, reading and publishing these passages had been "very painful," Trawny said; it had also introduced all sorts of practical complications into his life. "I'm the director of the Martin Heidegger Institute, and I actually want to be that for a longer time," he said, to laughter from the audience. ("You cannot be the director of the Adolf Hitler Institute," a colleague had warned him.) He went on, "If we would say that Heidegger really was an anti-Semitic philosopher, then, yeah, that would be really a catastrophe, in a certain way, for me." This was true, to varying degrees, for many in the room. It was good to hear someone admit that the controversy wasn't a matter of purely intellectual interest.

Berkowitz, who served as moderator, started things off by reading passages from the black notebooks. One began: "The Jews, with their marked gift for calculating, live, already for the longest time, according to the principle of race, which is why they are resisting its consistent application with utmost violence." When Berkowitz finished, it was quiet enough to hear traffic on the Bowery. Then, slowly, the professors, along with members of the audience, tried to talk about what Heidegger had written. No one knew what to say; the conversation was halting and desultory. After a while, the group paused for wine and crackers—the glummest cocktail hour ever. (Later, an enraged audience member found his words, and responded to the passage by saying, "That sentence strikes me as somehow so deranged, so alien to a sense of the real. . . . Anyone who is capable of that sort of argument cannot be trusted to think." A few people—by no means everyone—applauded.)

After the break, the group reconvened in a more reflective mood. It was pointed out that Heidegger's sons had fought in the war (both were imprisoned in Russian P.O.W. camps)—could that account for the irrationality of his thinking? Someone else wondered how Heidegger, who had chosen to publish these notebooks, imagined people would react to them. (He set the publication schedule himself, ensuring that the black notebooks would be published last.) Had he meant, by further damaging his reputation, to atone?

The anti-Semitic passages were from the nineteen-forties, which raised the question of their relevance to "Being and Time," which was written in the nineteen-twenties. "I've always preferred the early Heidegger," one man said, with evident relief.

There was a weary tone to much of the discussion, as if the Heideggerians, having been pushed around for too long, might at last have reached the end of their tolerance. Since 1987, when Victor Farías, a Chilean professor and former student of Heidegger's, published a book called "Heidegger and Nazism," people who care about Heidegger—that is, people who would rather spend their time thinking about the nature of Being—have found themselves forced to think about Nazis, too. Heidegger's Nazism is now almost a field unto itself, generating biographical scholarship (Hugo Ott's "Heidegger: A Political Life," in 1989) and interpretive polemic (Emmanuel Faye's "Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy").

These books have always been controversial in themselves. But, because of them, Heideggerians have been forced to grow accustomed to a certain set of facts. When Heidegger joined the Nazi party, in 1933, he had a professional reason for doing so: it went along with his new position as the *Führer-rector* (the President, essentially) of Freiburg University. But he was also an enthusiast. Photographs, impossible to unsee, show him wearing a Hitler moustache; that year, Heidegger told his students, "Let not theories and 'ideas' be the rules of your being. The *Führer* himself and he alone is German reality and its law, today and for the future." In 1935, he spoke about "the inner truth and greatness" of National Socialism. He was not a doctrinaire Nazi: one of his students recalled that, when the party instituted a series of compulsory political education lectures, Heidegger shooed a student making a party-line speech off the stage ("This jabber will stop immediately!," he's said to have shouted) and replaced him with a speaker who talked about Sigmund Freud. As rector, he interceded on behalf of three Jewish professors who were about to be fired, and, after the war, some of his Jewish students and colleagues declared that he wasn't anti-Semitic. Still, in ways large and small, he happily furthered the Nazi program—he applied the regime's "cleansing" laws to the student body, for example, denying financial aid to "non-Aryan" students.

In 1934, Heidegger gave up his rectorship, possibly under pressure from faculty members who resented the Nazis' influence, and, over time, his reservations deepened. He didn't share the Nazis' biologism or technophilia, and considered their thinking crude. It's often said that Heidegger wandered into Nazism because, with the daft egotism of a great philosopher, he thought that the Nazis agreed with him philosophically; when he realized that they weren't intellectuals, he pulled away. He remained a member of the Party until 1945, but was on its margins. After the war, he said privately that his participation in the movement had been "the biggest stupidity of my life"; Hannah Arendt, who carried on a love affair with Heidegger for many years, said that she thought of his Nazism as an "escapade"—a poorly thought through attempt to "intervene" in the world of human affairs. And yet Heidegger never truly apologized for being a Nazi; even worse, he never directly and publicly

addressed the reality of the Holocaust before he died, in 1976. (Thomas Sheehan's essay "[Heidegger and the Nazis](#)" is an excellent, and dispiriting, overview of the philosopher's Nazi years.)

At the Goethe Institute, it was still possible to take comfort in the idea that, as Berkowitz put it, Heidegger was "a Nazi in a different way than other people were Nazis." The yearning for a higher, more intellectual form of Nazism hardly absolves Heidegger—but, if you see his Nazism as a kind of special case, it's easier to argue that it shouldn't eclipse his intellectual legacy. Babette Babich pointed out that the trade-off is one we make all the time: many great artists and thinkers have said, done, or written things that are wrong. "I'm a Nietzschean, and Nietzscheans are used to this, because Nietzsche says terrible things about the Jews, he also says terrible things about women," she said. Philosophy professors, she went on, had to defend the thinkers that mattered, even if they had said or done terrible things, because it was so easy for a thinker to disappear from the intellectual landscape. "To this day, Nietzsche is only rarely taught at the Ph.D. level," she said. "Heidegger's not taught very often as it is." In short: Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater.

Trawny was unmoved by the idea of discretion; instead, he wanted to double down and talk it all out in public. "There's a point where we have to say, 'No, no, this is a point we cannot contextualize anymore,'" he said. "There is a responsibility to say, 'It's impossible—Heidegger, you cannot say that!... Even if you are the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century, this is over the limit.'" At the same time, he saw a way out for Heidegger in one of the philosopher's own concepts, "errancy"—the idea that human beings are not calculators, but conjecturers, and that being wrong is, therefore, an irreducible part of being a person. (In "The Essence of Truth," Heidegger wrote that "the errancy through which human beings stray is not something that, as it were, extends alongside them like a ditch into which they occasionally stumble; rather, errancy belongs to the inner constitution of the [existence] into which historical human beings are admitted.") Trawny continued, "He knew, at the end of his life, what was written in these notebooks. He was aware of the problems. But he couldn't take the pen and wipe it out. He tries to show us how deeply a philosopher can fail. I don't know whether this interpretation is strong, but I hope so—that this could be possible." (As to the question of "contamination," Trawny said that he regretted, somewhat, the choice of that metaphor. It may have been "too strong.")

On the whole, I find myself agreeing with Trawny. It's impossible to disavow Heidegger's thinking: it is too useful, and too influential, to be marginalized. (A few weeks ago, when I pulled "The Essence of Truth" down from my bookshelves, I found it as compelling as I had a decade ago.) But it's also impossible to set aside Heidegger's sins—and they cannot help but reduce the ardency with which his readers relate to him. Philosophers like to play it cool, but the truth is that intellectual life depends on passion. You don't spend years working your way through "Being and Time" because you're idly interested. You do it because you think that, by reading it, you might learn something precious and indispensable. The black notebooks, however seriously you take them, are a betrayal of that

ardency. They make it harder to care about—and, therefore, to really know—Heidegger's ideas. Even if his philosophy isn't contaminated by Nazism, our relationship with him is.

"The problem is not just that I'm morally shocked—it's also a problem that he is so dumb," Trawny said, as the evening drew to a close. "Observe what he is writing there. You see that, like all the others, he was not better. You thought it, actually; for long years, you thought he was very clever, but he is not. This is something that requires a certain distance," he concluded. "You shouldn't be too much in love with what you are reading, or you will be disappointed, like always."



Joshua Rothman is *The New Yorker's* archive editor. He is also a frequent contributor to *newyorker.com*, where he writes [a blog about books and ideas](#).
<http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/is-heidegger-contaminated-by-nazism>

Tallis in Wonderland – Ideas and Scholarship in Philosophy

Raymond Tallis asks: does it matter who said what?

One of the many privileges of writing this column is receiving a complimentary copy of *Philosophy Now*. This guarantees a happy evening or two in my favourite pub or café catching up on what my fellow contributors have been thinking about. The Letters section is also often rewarding, even when some of the correspondents suggest that Tallis might be closer to Blunderland than Wonderland. At least the comments make your columnist think again and, sometimes, change his mind.

A little while back there was an especially interesting letter from a writer whose name alas escapes me – an amnesia that is highly relevant in view of my present theme. He asked why it was necessary to attach proper names to philosophical ideas ('Cartesian' etc), and why so many articles in the philosophical literature were concerned with who said what. Why don't we deal directly with the ideas, and forget about who thought of them and how their views differed from those of their predecessors and successors? 'Let's get on with the arguments and forget about the scholarship' was the writer's essential point (as far as I recall). It got me thinking.

This column aside, my own philosophical writing is heavy with footnotes and references. I have also published a couple of monographs – *A Conversation with Martin Heidegger* and *The Enduring Significance of Parmenides* – freighted with the usual scholarly citations. In addition to guiding the reader to further research, citations are an essential courtesy. The ascription of ideas to their originators also pre-empts the suspicion that you are claiming for yourself thoughts that belong to others.

Even so, the letter writer's view is one with which I have some sympathy. Discussing what Philosopher P once had to say about Topic T and how his or her views were a reaction to, developed, or differed from, those of Philosophers Q, R, S etc., does seem a rather indirect approach to Topic T, and a roundabout way of doing philosophy. What's more, the literature that can grow up around the question of who said what, and why, can be endless, particularly when the views of a variety of commentators on Philosopher P's writings on Topic T are then compared, contrasted and judged. So the discussion of The Biggest Ideas – philosophy's distinctive contribution to the conversation humanity has with itself – can get tied up in secondary questions of attribution and other matters of seemingly inexhaustible interest to academics but not always of

any interest to the rest of us. Such scholarship may also offer tempting escape routes from thinking about Topic T, which may be difficult, even painfully so, requiring uncomfortable levels of concentration. One escape route leads to the History of Ideas, which, passing through the History of the Reception of Ideas, can lead to inconclusive arguments over how we should think about the thinkers of the past. Sooner or later, we find ourselves in an Echoland of allusion and quotation. The law of diminishing returns starts to apply, with the philosophical conversation becoming increasingly littered with '-ians', '-eans' and '-isms'. The cult of certain thinkers may sometimes get in the way of, or even act as a substitute for, hard thought. The introductory phrase "Wittgenstein said..." is a particularly powerful modern solvent of the critical sense, prompting the assumption that what follows will have deep significance. (In Wittgenstein's case, this is often, but not inevitably, true.) And there is often a Nietzschean aphorism that can give glamour to one's belief. Philosophical discourse may degenerate to name-dropping, and the cut and thrust of debate to the cut and paste of citation, with arguments acquiring spurious weight from the names to which they are attached.

The issue gains a particular urgency when we reflect that our lives are of finite duration and the opportunities within that restricted span to engage with philosophical issues such as 'The Place of the Mind in the Universe', 'The Nature of Humanity' and 'The Good Life and How to Live It' are limited. Hours spent reading commentaries on commentaries about what P thought about these topics are hours lost to thinking about them directly, or at least less indirectly. There is therefore a serious question about how much time we should spend thinking about what others have thought about The Biggest Questions instead of just going right ahead and thinking about them for ourselves. Should we even take the trouble to read the classic texts, such as Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy* or Heidegger's *Being and Time*? The answer to this must (of course) be 'yes' for several reasons, some less obvious than others.

Firstly, to philosophise in ignorance of what has been already said by those who have thought deeply enough to capture the attention of the world for hundreds, perhaps thousands, of years, is to deprive oneself of an essential assistance for one's own thought. It may be enjoyably self-flattering to think, like fifteen-year-old

Irie in Zadie Smith's *White Teeth*, that one is having thoughts that have never been thunk before; but it is an odds-on bet not only that they *have* been thought before, but they have been thought more deeply, more clearly, and in a more connected way. It is perverse to deny ourselves the shoulders of giants upon which to stand.

Even so, some may still wonder why we should go back to the originals, rather than relying on summaries and digests. Yet there is something very special about eavesdropping on the minds of great philosophers speaking in their own voices, and experiencing the questions and the arguments as they were felt when they were brand new or first seen clearly. However impersonal philosophical prose endeavours to be, the ideas in philosophical classics lose something when they are separated from the tone of voice in which they are expressed, or the tone of self which they reflect. And there is a special benefit – and pleasure – to be obtained from thinking along with writers who are speaking out of a world profoundly different from our own in a style of discourse that is remote from those we are used to. Most importantly, going back to the originals gives us insight into the process of the transformation of The Biggest Questions into specific philosophical problems. All this helps us to see and perhaps challenge the assumptions that frame our own inquiries when we think about our nature and our place in the universe. It may wake us out of a presentism whose most prominent delusion is that the way we see philosophical problems now is the only way to see them.

It would, however, be dishonest for me to pretend that I have read more than a tiny minority of the classics of Western philosophy. In my eagerness to make sure that I have not missed out on too much of 'the best that has been thought and said', I have often (to be honest, usually) settled for digests. The truth is that even the most dedicated reader could not have more than a brushing acquaintance with a small proportion of those works which are rightly regarded as key to the evolution of philosophical thought.

So we come back to the secondary literature – and thence to the discussions between X, Y, and Z as to the correct interpretation of what P had to say about T. At first sight, this discussion seems easy to defend. If P is worth reading, then he or she is worth reading correctly. Philosophy is a conversation – ultimately with one's self, facing the world in solitude – but a conversation nonetheless. But as I have just argued, if it is to be worthwhile, it will be nourished by the Great Conversation led by the great thinkers that has taken place over the centuries. They will liberate you from some of your limitations. The entry of third and fourth parties, who have devoted years of painstaking scholarship to elucidating these thinkers, can only enrich the conversation.

That does not, however, quite settle the matter: there is the sheer quantity of secondary literature to consider. What of the literally tens of thousands of volumes of commentary on Aristotle alone; or the hundreds of thousands of academic articles published in contemporary journals by professionals needing to get into print? In recent decades, academic philosophers responding to the expectations of university tenure committees and promotion boards have created an

industry in which production is disconnected from consumption – even by fellow professionals, never mind by the general community of Inquirers After Truth. Faced with this Amazon of logorrhoea, we must conclude that what one reads about P can be at best a few grains picked at random from sand-dunes of scholarship on P. Even more worrying, the volume of competition makes it more of a mere accident that one is reading about P rather than Q.

Of all human activities, philosophy is, or should be, closest to the ambition to get one's head round the universe (and hence around one's head). Its glory is its absolute, unashamed generality. If our aim is to understand the universe better, it would seem to follow, therefore, that we should not delay too long over what went on in P's head, which amounts to less than one billion-billion-billionth part of said universe. (I am aware, gentle reader, of the category error at work here, but bear with me.) On the other hand, if we are not to remain stuck at Square One, we need interlocutors in our conversation with ourselves about the world we live in. Those interlocutors are entitled to be read properly – hence the role of commentators, guides, expositors, and the importance of the rigour and punctilio they bring to their task. And yet to the earnest seeker after truth there seem to be 'things that are important beyond all this fiddle' with matters of scholarly fact (to appropriate the poet Marianne Moore's wonderful phrase).


There is a deeper conflict here, and deeper questions about a life in which philosophy is important. At issue is the naïve assumption that our inquiries start from an absolute beginning corresponding to the search for first principles. Any actual philosophising is mired in contingency – shaped by a multitude of accidents that define a narrow cognitive parish in which our philosophical project finds its starting point and which defines what counts as progress towards an end. Even the great thinkers are limited by the accidents of the time and place of their lives. Aristotle died in ignorance of how Plotinus, Descartes, Newton and Frege were to change fundamentally the terms of philosophical debate. In our youth we enter the ongoing polyphonic conversation of philosophy in the midst of things, and we leave the still-ongoing conversation mid-sentence several decades later. We join the philosophical caravan for only a short stretch of an unending journey.

This tension between the aspiration of philosophy towards fundamental eternal truths, and our necessarily local and transient participation reflects our wider limitations. Our life is our forever – it is all we know – and yet it is only a minute part of a world lived in by many millions who came before and will live after us. Endeavouring to transcend ourselves and understand that world, we are often stranded in the Kingdom of the Secondary. Those scholarly footnotes – essential, yet distracting – symbolise a contradiction at the heart of the adventure of thought we call philosophy. So thank you Anon for your provocative letter in *Philosophy Now* prompting me to re-visit a longstanding argument with myself.

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Raymond Tallis's new book Epimethean Imaginings is out now from Acumen.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/104/Ideas_and_Scholarship_in_Philosophy



ELECTRIC UNIVERSE

Introduction by Dan Eden

The picture above is our universe. No one could possibly take such a picture because the universe is so big. The Milky Way Galaxy, some 150,000 light years across, is just a tiny dot, barely visible in this computer generated image, based on deep space observations.

What's interesting about the structure of the universe is that it is made up of countless string-like filaments that arrange themselves in parallel lines and sometimes intersect at "nodes" that encircle empty holes. Some scientists have described the universe as looking like Swiss Cheese.

This new view of how the universe is constructed has upset the traditional paradigm of science. It contradicts the model of the universe that was predicted by the 17th century physicist, Isaac Newton, in which gravity is the basic fabric of everything. It's also hard to imagine a Big Bang theory with a structure like this. Where's the central point of the initial explosion? Why do we have this strange kind of structure?


At the moment, most scientists are struggling to explain the traditional model in light of this new evidence but others are quite confident that have found an explanation in a theory called "the electrical universe."

It's all about plasma

Science moves slowly and carefully. Old ideas and theories -- paradigms -- are stubbornly defended even when they are opposed by new discoveries. When Sir Isaac Newton developed his gravitational theories in the 17th century, electricity was not yet understood. Now, 400 years later, we have begun to understand the nature of electricity and something interesting called *plasma*.

Plasma has been called the "fourth state" of matter, after solids, liquids and gases. **Most of the matter in the universe is in the form of plasma.** A plasma is formed if some of the negatively charged electrons are separated from their host atoms in a gas, leaving the atoms with a positive charge. The negatively charged electrons, and the positively charged atoms (known as positive ions) are then free to move separately under the influence of an applied voltage or magnetic field. Their net movement constitutes an electrical current. So, one of the more important properties of a plasma is that it can conduct electrical current. It does so by forming current filaments that follow magnetic field lines. Filamentary patterns are ubiquitous in the cosmos. That's what you see in the computer generated image.

The Electric Universe model grew out of a broad interdisciplinary approach to science. It is not a technique taught in universities. The Electric Universe is based more on observations and experiment than abstract theory. It recognizes connections between diverse disciplines.



It concludes that the crucial requirement for understanding the universe is to take fully into account the basic electrical nature of atoms and their interactions. Strangely, this is not the case in conventional cosmology where weaker magnetism and the infinitely weaker force of gravity rule the cosmos. Such a simplification may suit a theoretical physics based on electrical neutrality of matter in Earthly laboratories but it does not apply in space where plasma dominates.

No where does the Electrical Universe model impose itself more on our paradigm of creation than with regards to the formation of our Sun and planets.

The Newtonian theory of a gravity forming gaseous body has the Sun coalescing and contracting. This is followed by cooler dust clouds which encircle the central mass and form gravitational clumps of accreting planetary bodies. But the electrical model is more dynamic, allowing large clumps of plasma to change orbits and eject smaller globs of plasma that form smaller orbital bodies.

If we consider that the entire universe is made from plasma, then huge galaxies are formed much the same way as suns and planets. This fits neatly into a kind of "macrocosm" and "microcosm" order.

Proponents of the Electrical Universe observe the various bodies in our solar system. They note the pockmarked surface of the Moon and satellites around other planets but they also pay attention to human history in legends, epics and icons. They envision a time when the planets were in eccentric orbits, often

coming very close to Earth, causing huge electrical bolts to discharge between the heavenly bodies, and sometimes colliding with each other. They view the

craters on the Moon as evidence of a planetary cataclysm which supports their timeline.

The Enuma Elish Sumerian Epic Of Creation, 1500 BC, from the ancient Ashurbanipal Library of Nineveh in northern Iraq is one of even cuneiform tablets relating the epic battle between the solar deity Marduk and the celestial dragoness Tiamat, discovered within the ruins of Nineveh in the late 19th century. Giving accounts remarkably similar to biblical stories, they were first published in 1876 as the "The Chaldean Genesis."


Modern translations of this epic now suggest that it was telling the events of a celestial nature relating to the formation of planet Earth and a great cataclysm in which the planets approached each other, releasing electrical bolts of energy, as theorized in the Electric Universe.

"Appearing from Outer Space, "MARDUK" was still a newborn planet... belching fire and emitting radiation... As "MARDUK" neared the other planets... "clothed with the halo... of ten Gods".

*"His approach... has stirred up... **electrical** and other emissions... from the other members of the Solar System. Ten Celestial bodies awaited him... the Sun and only nine other planets."*

"The Gods have decreed MARDUK's destiny, their combined gravitational pull... has now... determined... MARDUK's orbital path, so that he can go... but one was... toward a "battle", a collision with TIAMAT!"

*The discharge of **electrical bolts**... as the two planets converged, the gravitational pull (a net), of one upon the other..."*-- Enuma Elish



This evidence suggests that, at one time, Venus approached the Earth exhibiting a comet-like tail as it streaked across the sky. Electrical arcs zapped between planets as they approached each other, causing deep scars and craters and ejecting debris that rained down on the surface of the Earth. These events, according to theorists, were recorded in human history as epics of the Gods of Heaven and in archetypal shapes and artistic representations of antiquity.

Most of these epics and artistic motifs can be found in ancient Egypt. Here, the electrical universe is revealed by a civilization that appears to have understood what some scientists are just now beginning to realize as a better paradigm for understanding how the universe is made and functions.

The following illustrations from ancient Egypt were provided by Gary Gilligan.

Velikovsky's Comet Venus

Immanuel Velikovsky concluded from his extensive interdisciplinary research that the planet Venus was remembered from the time of the dawn of civilization as a brilliant cometary body.

While there is a wealth of literary sources to draw upon, when it comes to the pictorial evidence it isn't as forthcoming. No images can be conclusively identified as actually representing Venus in cometary form, a situation that essentially shouldn't exist. After all, it stands to reason that it was naked eye observations that primarily inspired the myths. So, at the very least the imagery should be equal to or analogous to the literary sources -- but this clearly isn't the case.

Have we overlooked something? Is it possible images of Comet Venus have been staring us in the face for decades?



The image on the right has been taken from the back of Tutankhamun's throne. It depicts the wife of king Tut, Ankhsunamun. The queen is shown wearing a very distinctive crown consisting of a disk surmounted by cow horns and two tall plumes.

This unusual headdress made its appearance in the New Kingdom and features prominently in Egyptian art -- numerous queens can be seen sporting this particular crown. Although the actual shape or outline

remained constant (for approximately 900 years), there exist a few variants to the colours shown. For example, the disk was predominantly painted the traditional Egyptian deep red, the 'horns' normally black, while the plumes can be gold, a plain yellow, or blue and without the 'filaments'.

Like most Egyptian crowns encompassing a sphere, it somehow represents an aspect of the sun, or so the conventional way of thinking goes. This is a perplexing line of thought since the Sun is a golden glaring ball -- it doesn't have cow horns wrapped around it and most certainly exhibits no signs of enormous cometary tails. It is apparent even to the uninitiated that what we are looking at here is a comet -- a large comet with a plumed tail. Furthermore, if Egyptian art is used as a measure of time, this comet graced our skies for nearly a thousand years. It is carved, painted, and represented in statues the length and breadth of the Nile valley. Even the legendary Cleopatra wore this headdress.

Could this particular crown be a true-life physical representation of proto-Venus as it appeared in ancient times?

To quote Wal Thornhill:

'In the electrical model of the solar system, any body on a sufficiently eccentric orbit about the Sun will exhibit cometary features. For ancient people to have seen Venus as an Earth-threatening comet, Venus must have had an eccentric orbit that brought the planet near to Earth'.

Are we looking at Velikovsky's comet Venus?

Comparing the comet crown with the Venus diagram on the left reveals some fundamental similarities, far too close to be deemed coincidental. In fact, for all intents and purposes they are virtually identical!

The orb represents the body of Venus: the horns signify the bow shock as the solar wind slams into the Venusian surface, enveloping its body due to a lack of an intrinsic magnetic field. The two large plumes represent Venus' magnetotail -- split in two and flowing downstream at least three times its diameter.

The image on the left is just a diagram, and today Venus' comet tail can only be detected by magnetometers and charged particle detectors. However, place Venus on an eccentric orbit in a highly charged 'dusty' environment and the normally invisible magnetotail (and bow shock) would become highly visible.

Wal Thornhill commenting on Venus' cometary magnetotail:

'A power surge in those filaments today would cause them to glow, and Venus would form a "stupendous" cometary apparition in the sky. The forensic evidence would stand up in court, showing that Venus was a comet within human memory'.

Science is slowly proving Velikovsky to be correct in a number of areas. Perhaps with the comet crown of ancient Egypt we now have the pictorial evidence to match.



Re (Ra) the Red Sun

A hazed red Sun, planetary chaos, and a solar system besieged by dust and debris.

The Egyptian Sun god Re was typically represented as a sun-disk, or as a falcon-headed man wearing a red sun-disk on his head. Such imagery points to the god's solar

character. The following epithets present traits which are consistent with the life-giving properties of the Sun experienced today.

**'Re is the great light who shinest in the heavens
Lord of all lands... praise Re when he riseth at the
beginning of each day.
Thou passest over the sky, and every face
watcheth thee and thy course,
for thou hast been hidden from their gaze.
Thou dost show thyself at dawn and at eventide
day by day'**



Re's solar disk features heavily in Egyptian art and there exist numerous orbs adorning every monument, tomb, and temple wall throughout Egypt.

They are also carved on stela and statues, painted on coffins and sarcophagi, as well as on scrolls of papyrus. They are even incorporated into Egyptian jewellery. Since the Sun was the primary source of life, such ubiquitous representation is only to be expected. However, there is something unusual about the way the Egyptians represented our nearest star that is incredibly revealing when considered alongside planetary chaos. Re's most basic form consisted of a simple red disk. Why was this? Why not portray the Sun as it appeared?

The Sun is a blinding, golden-yellow disk with emanating rays -- a ball of glaring, golden light. A red disk is drab and lifeless by comparison, and yet Egyptian art reveals not one single golden glaring Sun

with a complete 360 degree sweep of sun rays. A perplexing situation, especially when considering that gold was the flesh of the gods and Re was the Sun god par excellence as epitomised in the godly pharaoh's title *sa re*, which means 'offspring of Re'.

Whether Velikovsky's Comet Venus was the largest 'volcano' in the solar system, spewing out countless tons of sulphurous gas from its many thousands of volcanic vents, or Mars was disturbed from its orbit to undergo a catastrophic transformation, the result of any cosmic catastrophe would have been the release of immeasurable quantities of debris, dust and gas.

This debris eventually settled down into the plane of the ecliptic where it impacted the planets, the Moon, or fell into the Sun. To understand the effect that a stream of dust and gas 93 million miles long had on the Sun's appearance, we need look no further than the art of the Egyptians. Their portrayals clearly reveal the red haze that surrounded our Sun. The Egyptians carved, drew and painted a red Sun because all they ever experienced was a red Sun. Furthermore, if the duration of Egyptian dynasties is anything to go by, our Sun was hazed red for an incredible 3,000 years.

The supposition that ancient cultures only experienced a diminished red Sun is both profound and exciting. It allows us to take much of the art and many seemingly bizarre beliefs at face value. Not the least being the fact that a hazed Sun means there was no glare, so they were able to look directly at the Sun without being blinded. This led to naked-eye observations of electrical phenomena such as coronal mass ejections (CMEs), flares, and prominences.

The image on the right at the top of the page depicts an Egyptian Sun encircled by a yellow royal uraeus serpent which was known to spit fire and venom at Egypt's enemies. The image on the left was taken by SOHO and can be used for comparison, providing some idea of how the Sun appeared in a world dominated by cosmic catastrophe.

The cobra is a symbolic representation of vicious CME's 'striking out' several times the diameter of the Sun at sungrazing cometary bodies: snakelike CME's protecting the body of Re by spitting fire at Egypt's enemies. In ancient times, those eruptions might have been observable on a daily basis and perceived to be a perennial battle against the forces of evil.

Regarding the association between CME's and comets, Stephen Smith commented in a previous Picture of the Day:

'Comet NEAT swung close by the Sun in 2003, apparently initiating a CME eruption that appeared to impact the comet. Astronomers at the time discounted any relationship between the two events because of the size differential between the comet and the Sun.'

'However, several other sungrazers have been associated with violent flares. One event can be a coincidence, two can be long odds, but three or more cannot be dismissed as mere oddities.'



Regarding comet 96P/Machholz:

'It did not rapidly dissipate, however. Instead, its intense charge differential caused a gigantic CME to discharge from the Sun, blasting out for millions of kilometers'.

The yellow coronal ring encompassing the snake represents the highly charged million-degree corona of the Sun, bursting through as a yellow ring due to its 20 million degree temperature. Gold really was the 'flesh of the gods', as bursts of golden energy were also observed emanating from the body of Re, as in the image above.



Egypt today has one of the most sunniest and driest climates in the world. Its sunsets and sunrises invoke thoughts of serenity and are a sight to behold. In total contrast, the ancient Egyptians believed Re's daily path across the sky was fraught with dangers. It was believed that the setting Sun prompted a perpetual nightly battle with the demons of the underworld. It was a doomsday scenario, and they believed that the Sun might not shine the next day.



The fighting aspect of the Sun is also played out on Mesopotamian cylinder seals. The 'dispenser of divine justice,' the Sun god Utu/Shamash [above], is shown with fiery solar 'rays' (CME's) emanating from his shoulders. He also holds a pruning-saw. He is depicted cutting his way through the eastern horizon to again rise victorious.

On some seals the snakelike shoulder rays end in stars, indicative of CME's zapping space debris. Upon consideration, a red Sun at war opens a window to many ancient enigmatic beliefs.

The Sahara Desert An extraterrestrial sand scar?


The light areas in the image above show the wide swath of desert area that extends across Africa, the Middle East, and the entire Asian continent. It encompasses many deserts including the Sahara.



The Sahara is the world's largest hot desert. At over 9,000,000 square kilometres (3,500,000 square miles), it covers most of Northern Africa, making it almost as large as the United States or the continent of Europe.

The desert stretches from the Red Sea, including parts of the Mediterranean coasts, to the outskirts of the Atlantic Ocean. Some of the sand dunes can reach 180 meters (600 ft.) in height. Mixed in with the oceanic sands there are large rock formations, boulders, stones and pebbles. Some have compared areas of the Sahara to the surface of Mars.

The sands of the Sahara hold many secrets. It wasn't always a vast desolate ocean of sand; around 5,000 years ago it was a very different terrain. It was a sub-tropical paradise where deer, hippos and elephants were hunted and giraffes and rhinoceros roamed the area. With a plentiful supply of food, thousands of hunter-gatherers flocked to live in this lush savannah.



These facts are evident from the discovery of hundreds of human graves and numerous rock paintings [above], depicting people hunting and even swimming.

Furthermore, radar images taken by the NASA space shuttle show that beneath the sand are networks of rivers, once spanning the entire Sahara. North Africa was once alive with people! What happened to this lush green world?

It was initially believed the Sahara died out abruptly about 5,000 years ago. However, recent studies have supposedly shown this to be incorrect. Conventional scientists believe the process took about three millennia as reported by [Reuters in May 2008](#).

"The once-green Sahara turned to desert over thousands of years rather than in an abrupt shift as previously believed, according to a study on Thursday that may help understanding of future climate changes. The study of ancient pollen, spores and aquatic organisms in sediments in Lake Yoa in northern Chad showed the region gradually shifted from savannah 6,000 years ago towards the arid conditions that took over about 2,700 years ago. The findings, about one of the biggest environmental shifts of the past 10,000 years, challenge past belief based on evidence in marine sediments that a far quicker change created the world's biggest hot desert."

Sand is the result of finely weathered and eroded rock. It is believed it takes tens of thousands, if not millions of years for exposed rock to weather into sand. The longer this erosion takes place, the finer the grains. The sand in the Sahara is some of the oldest on the planet; it is believed to have existed for seven million years. Some of the sand dunes are rich in iron ore. The impurities stain the quartz particles, which accounts for their yellow colour.

Where did the Sahara sand come from? It did not exist 6,000 years ago. Experts are proposing that vast oceans of sand formed in less than 3,300 years. This is impossible because Saharan sand is some of the oldest on the planet. Putting this into context means that an area the size of the US has been covered in a vast sea of sand in what has to be the blink of an eye in geological terms. This makes no sense because the time frame for the formation of the sand does not allow it according to consensus theories. If the adjoining deserts swathing out across the Middle East and Asia are also considered, this equates to an area twice the size of the US. Where did all this sand come from?

Is it possible the earth is covered with debris from recent cosmic catastrophe? Could debris such as large boulders, rocks, stones, pebbles, dust and sand which are believed to be indigenous to Earth actually be extraterrestrial in origin?

Wall Thornhill speaking on "Coast to Coast" November 26, 2007:

"When you have an highly charged object like a comet coming towards the earth, before it strikes the earth there will be an electrical discharge between the two bodies and that discharge will usually be of sufficient magnitude to destroy the incoming object -- so you end up with a shower of sand and stuff like that."

"The famous Chicago fires where that whole area of the US was lit by strange fires and falls of sand and such like. And this occurred at the time of the disappearance of Biela's comet."

Countless tons of rocks bombarded Earth's atmosphere, fragmenting and breaking up into fine grains of sand. As it fell to Earth it covered vast areas of once-lush,

green fertile land, turning it into the barren deserts we see today.

This sand forms a gigantic scar across the landscape which suggests great swarms of debris were hurled at the Earth, and the enormous quantities of sand demonstrates the extent of this bombardment.

Amun - An Ancient Aurora Filled Sky


Planetary chaos and intense geomagnetic storms encapsulated in the 'king of the gods' Amun.

Auroras are striking displays of coloured lights often seen over the Earth's magnetic poles. They occur when the solar wind particles trapped by the Earth's magnetic field collide with molecules of air in the upper atmosphere (ionosphere). They are a spectacular sight

and take the form of rapidly shifting patches of colour and dancing columns of light of various hues. The colours observed depend on several factors such as atmospheric conditions, intensity of the solar wind, temperature and location. The aurora is always present in almost every area of the sky, but it is usually too faint to be seen except near the North and South Poles. The intensity of the aurora is dictated by the solar wind, a stream of electrically charged particles from the Sun. When the solar wind blows exceptionally strong, the aurora increases. When the Sun is in the active phase it can unleash powerful magnetic storms that disable satellites, threaten astronaut safety, and even disrupt communication systems on Earth.




Amun is most commonly shown entirely in human form. Often he is standing or sitting on a throne wearing a red, flat-topped crown with two tall plumes and holding a sceptre in his hand. Thousands of images of Amun are to be found throughout the Pharaonic Egypt. The enormous temple complex of Karnak [Above] was the principal home of Amun where he was worshiped as the prominent divine entity. During the New Kingdom, his popularity eclipsed that of other major deities so much so he was referred to as the 'king of the gods'.



The above image depicts Amun in typical form with blue skin, yellow kilt, and red flat-topped crown with tall plumes segmented into sections of blue, red and green (?). A thin yellow frame separates these 'sacred' colours.



The above Northern Lights photo depicts a plumed or pillared aurora with similar colours i.e. mainly blue supported by green, red and a hint of yellow.



Comparing Amun's tall plumes with the aurora photo it is apparent they are clearly a symbolic representation of intense geomagnetic storms that dominated ancient skies.

Amun's epithets are completely consistent with an aurora filled sky.

Mysterious of form
Who raised high the sky
The king of the south and of the north
Prince of rays and beams of light
The flame which sendeth forth rays of light with mighty splendour
Living flame who came forth from Nun
King of heaven, ruler of the two lands
Who makes light/gives free passage
Secret of manifestations and sparkling of shape
Marvellous god rich in forms
Light was his coming into existence on the first occasion

Amun's colours were at times interchangeable. Although his flesh was predominantly blue (main sacred colour), some images reveal a red coloured flesh. His segmented plumes were sometimes coloured yellow or white, as too was his crown. The plumes were often depicted devoid of segments and were painted just one colour, normally yellow or white.

The main colours of the aurora are blue, yellow, red and green and any variants in Amun's colours merely

reflect the hues seen at the time which could change on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. Sometimes red neon lights covered the entire sky, other times blue, green, yellow, white or a combination of all colours. The Egyptians reflected what they saw in their art.

The aurora manifests itself in many forms including homogenous arcs, bands, active arcs, rays, pillars, plumes, draperies (or curtains) and coronas. The aurora variations are reflected in the epithet which describes Amun as the 'One creator who has millions of forms & transformations'.

Amun was also known as 'the hidden one' and the 'one whose true form could never be known'. Such 'hidden' traits reflect the transparency of the aurora. Unlike the light emanating from the body of the Sun, the auroral light had no solid body or attributable physical 'form'. In this respect the Egyptians had a blank canvass, and so chose to encapsulate the aurora as a human being adorning auroral hues and a plumed auroral crown.

The solar wind, above, is deflected around the earth to form an enormous magnetotail which can extend more than 3,976,766 miles out into space. It is divided into two lobes, or tails, rising and setting in opposition to the Sun.

Today it is invisible. From the point of view of Earth's horizons it appeared as two mountains with the title 'Lord of the Two Mountains'. Those electrical apparitions were also attributed to Amun. It's probably why he wore two plumes on top of his crown and not one, or three.

During that period all close proximity planetary bodies exhibited highly visible electrical traits (this would include the cometary plumes of Comet Venus). These were all attributed to Amun. It is the very reason why the omnipresent Amun/aurora rose to prominence to become the 'king of the gods'.

Perhaps 3,000 years of cosmic catastrophe is staring us in the face by way of every facade the length and breadth of the Nile Valley.


<http://www.viewzone.com/electricaluniverse.html>

Climate debate: Lord Monckton vs HRH Prince Charles

Posted: February 5, 2014 by Rog

Tallbloke in [alarmism](#), [Education](#), [humour](#), [People power](#), [Philosophy](#), [Politics](#)

Following HRH Prince Charles intemperate remarks about 'headless chickens' [reported at the talkshop](#) last week, Lord Monckton has written him an open letter, reproduced below.



QUEEN STREET ♦ EDINBURGH ♦ EH2
0131-2 XXXXXX1 ♦ MONCKTON @XXXX.COM ♦ 07XX4 50XXXX 3
FROM: THE VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY

**His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales,
Clarence House, London.
Candlemas, 2014**

Your Royal Highness' recent remarks describing those who have scientific and economic reason to question the Establishment opinion on climatic apocalypse in uncomplimentary and unroyal terms as "headless chickens" mark the end of our constitutional monarchy and a return to the direct involvement of the Royal Family, in the Person of our future king, no less, in the cut and thrust of partisan politics.

Now that Your Royal Highness has offered Your Person as fair game in the shootout of politics, I am at last free to offer two options. I need no longer hold back, as so many have held back, as Your Royal Highness' interventions in politics have become more frequent and less acceptable in their manner as well as in their matter.

Option 1. Your Royal Highness will renounce the Throne forthwith and for aye. Those remarks were rankly party-political and were calculated to offend those who still believe, as Your Royal Highness plainly does not, that the United Kingdom should be and remain a free country, where any subject of Her Majesty may study science and economics, may draw his conclusions from his research and may publish the results, however uncongenial the results may be.

The line has been crossed. No one who has intervened thus intemperately in politics may legitimately occupy the Throne. Your Royal Highness' arrogant and derogatory dismissiveness towards the near-50 percent of your subjects who no longer follow the New Religion is tantamount to premature abdication. Goodnight, sweet prince. No more "Your Royal Highness."

Hi, there, Chazza! You are a commoner now, just like most of Her Majesty's subjects. You will find us a cheerfully undifferential lot. Most of us don't live in palaces, and none of us goes everywhere with his own personalized set of monogrammed white leather lavatory seat covers.

The United Kingdom Independence Party, which until recently I had the honor to represent in Scotland, considers – on the best scientific and economic evidence – that the profiteers of doom are unjustifiably enriching themselves at our expense.

For instance, even the unspeakable Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has accepted advice from me and my fellow expert reviewers that reliance upon ill-constructed and defective computer models to predict climate was a mistake. Between the pre-final and final drafts of the "Fifth Assessment Report," published late last year, the Panel ditched the models and substituted its own "expert assessment" that in the next 30 years

the rate of warming will be half what the models predict.

In fact, the dithering old fossils in white lab coats with leaky Biros sticking out of the front pocket now think the rate of warming over the next 30 years could be less than in the past 30 years, notwithstanding an undiminished increase in the atmospheric concentration of plant food. Next time you talk to the plants, ask them whether they would like more CO₂ in the air they breathe. Their answer will be Yes.

The learned journals of economics are near-unanimous in saying it is 10-100 times costlier to mitigate global warming today than to adapt to its supposedly adverse consequences the day after tomorrow.

Besides, in the realm that might have been yours there has been no change – none at all – in mean surface temperature for 25 full years. So if you are tempted to blame last year's cold winter (which killed 31,000 before their time) or this year's floods (partly caused by the Environment Agency's mad policy of returning dozens of square miles of the Somerset Levels to the sea) on global warming, don't.

You got your science and economics wrong. And you were rude as well. And you took sides in politics. Constitutionally, that's a no-no. Thronewise, mate, you've blown it.

On the other hand, we Brits are sport-mad. So here is option 2. I am going to give you a sporting second chance, Charlie, baby.

You see, squire, you are no longer above politics. You've toppled off your gilded perch and now you're in it up to your once-regal neck. So, to get you used to the idea of debating on equal terms with your fellow countrymen, I'm going to give you a once-in-a-reign opportunity to win back your Throne in a debate about the climate. The motion: "Global warming is a global crisis." You say it is. I say it isn't.

We'll hold the debate at the Cambridge Union, for Cambridge is your alma mater and mine. You get to pick two supporting speakers and so do I. We can use PowerPoint graphs. The Grand Debate will be televised internationally over two commercial hours. We let the world vote by phone, before and after the debate. If the vote swings your way, you keep your Throne. Otherwise, see you down the pub.

Cheers, mate!

Monckton of Brenchley

Viscount Monckton of Brenchley

<http://tallbloke.wordpress.com/>

As Bad As A Crime, A Blunder

By Eric Margolis, September 26, 2014

Having nearly provoked war over Ukraine with nuclear-armed Russia, the Obama administration has now launched a full-scale crusade in Iraq and Syria against the evil Saracens of ISIS.

America's aerial might, including B-1 heavy bombers, is plastering ISIS miscreants. Washington's Arab allies and rightwing governments in Canada and Australia have joined the fray. The British will be next.

ISIS reserved particular venom for the French, referring to them as "dirty, spiteful" French (the Brits will love this one) whose warplanes joined the bombing crusade. The new plan seems to be: "Kill'em all and let God sort them out," a Vietnam-era slogan echoing the original from the Middle Ages.

The real problem is that the White House's strategy looks like it's being run by two angry women, Susan

Rice and UN ambassador Samantha Power. Neither they nor President Barack Obama seems to have any grasp of military or geopolitical strategy. It's amateur hour driven by a frenzy of alarmist hysteria from politicians and the media.

Iran's president put it perfectly when he called America's new Syria-Iraq a "blunder," adding "certain intelligence agencies have put blades in the hands of madmen, who now spare no one."

While the US is cooking up a new, bigger mess in the Levant, the old mess in Afghanistan only gets worse.

Last week, Washington's colonial bureau finally managed to cobble together a political deal in Afghanistan between two rivals for the presidency, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah.

Ashraf Ghani is Washington's choice for president; Abdullah will act as 'chief executive,' a sort newly created role of prime minister sure to break down. To no surprise, they are expected to quickly sign an agreement to keep 25,000 US and NATO troops in Afghanistan for years to come.

Outgoing Afghan president Hamid Karzai, installed in office by the CIA soon after the 2001 US invasion, loosed a Parthian shaft at his former American allies, asserting they did not want peace in Afghanistan, rather ongoing occupation.

Karzai, who has emerged as a genuine nationalist, has stated that the only thing the US and its allies accomplished in Afghanistan was to kill large numbers of civilians.

Over in Iraq, former prime minister Nouri Maliki, another CIA-installed "asset," also refused to sign a pact allowing long-term garrisoning by US troops. So out he went. Now Karzai joins Maliki, recalling Henry Kissinger's quip that it's more dangerous being America's ally than its enemy.

The US may shuffle the deck in Afghanistan, but its basic problems remain. Ghani, a former academic and banker, is a decent person, but he is far too westernized, has little support among majority Pashtuns, and is widely seen as a willing American collaborator and sock puppet.

His erstwhile rival, Abdullah Abdullah, is the front-man for the Northern Alliance, a Tajik gang from the Panjshir Valley that was a Soviet ally when Moscow occupied Afghanistan.

The Uzbek warlord, Rashid Dostam, a major war criminal and Soviet collaborator, joined the Northern Alliance and became its strongman.

The Northern Alliance collaborated with the US after its invasion, just as Tajiks and Uzbeks had done with the Soviets. Afghanistan's communists gained control of the brutal national intelligence service, interior ministry, police and foreign affairs. But their main business remained narcotics.

Taliban virtually eliminated Afghanistan's drug trade save in the region controlled by the Northern Alliance. Today, Afghanistan's drug production and exports have reached what the UN calls "record highs."

The US remains the proud owner of the world's leading producer of heroin. The drug lords that kept Karzai in power are all close US allies. But no one in Washington cares to talk about the dirty underside of Afghan politics or how its government runs on drug money. Foreign aid is the only other source of government income.

Most Pashtuns detest the suave Abdullah Abdullah and his fellow Tajiks. For their part, Tajiks look down on Pashtun as backwards mountaineers. Everyone mistrusts the minority Uzbek and Hazara, both of whom also collaborated with the US occupation or Iran.

Taliban, Afghanistan's most popular and authentic political movement, is predominantly Pashtun.

Washington's refusal to talk directly to the demonized Taliban ensures that there will be no real political compromise in wretched Afghanistan, which has been at war for the past 35 years.

The half-forgotten Afghan War has cost the US close to 2,500 dead, 17,000 wounded and over \$1 trillion. The "reconstructed" Afghan army will be as likely to collapse without direct US support as was Iraq's army, three divisions of which ran away at first contact with ISIS fighters.

So why does Washington keep pumping billions into Afghanistan, which has no oil? Because, in keeping with imperial logic and strategy, it remains the best pipeline route to export the oil riches of the Caspian Basin south to Karachi on the Arabian Sea. And because Afghanistan overwatches Central Asia, where China is increasingly active.

Lastly, because the mighty US military industrial complex cannot accept being defeated by Pashtun tribesmen. Nor can the American, Canadian, British and French politicians who sent their soldiers to fight and die in this useless war.


<http://ericmarqolis.com/2014/09/as-bad-as-a-crime-a-blunder/>

Justice for Germans

Free Book:

[**Positive Christianity in the Third Reich, by Professor Cajus Fabricius**](#)

Posted on 08/13/2013 by justice4germans



Professor Cajus Fabricius was a Christian Theologian, an NSDAP party member and a member of Hitler's government.

So who better to understand and to explain Positive Christianity and the role of religion within National Socialist Germany? His book was first published in German in 1935 and later translated and re-published for the world market in English in 1937, in an effort to combat propaganda and to set the record straight concerning Christianity and freedom of religion in National Socialist Germany. Moreover, to demonstrate that National Socialism was Christian at its very core, and neither pagan nor occult.

Why is this book virtually unheard of? Why is the author unheard of? You will find practically nothing about him on the internet or in various encyclopedia sites? Not even a picture of him! It should be obvious the court historians and the purveyors the perpetual "Anti-Nazi" propaganda would not be well served by referring to this author and his expert treatise, based upon first-hand knowledge, and unquestionably, with the full knowledge and blessing of the Fuehrer Adolf Hitler and other high level party and government members.

Fifteen minute introduction segment on YouTube (feel free to share it)
Download the free e-book: [Positive Christianity in the Third Reich by Cajus Fabricius.pdf](#)

Listen to the Audio-Book which I have narrated (2 hours, 37 minutes)
OR Download the [free mp3 Audio-Book](#)
Here are some text excerpts from the book:

"We demand liberty for all religious denominations in the State, so far as they are not a danger to it and do not militate against the morality and moral sense of the German race. The Party as such, stands for positive Christianity but does not bind itself in the matter of creed to any particular confession. It combats the Jewish-materialist spirit within and without us, and is convinced that our nation can achieve permanent health

from within only on the principle: The Common Interest Before Self-Interest."



Such is Point 24 of the Programme of the German National Socialistic Party. Since 1920 this has been the unchanged and unwavering guiding principle of the Movement with respect to its attitude towards religion, and since 1933 the inviolable expression of what is to be as law to the whole German nation. Adolf Hitler, its Führer and Chancellor has repeatedly affirmed this article, especially the main clause relating to Positive Christianity. This was particularly the case in the three notable speeches made by him in the year 1934, namely, on January 30th, August 17th and 26th. **On these three solemn occasions the Führer stated in words that left no doubt as to their meaning, that National Socialism affirmed Positive Christianity.**



Moreover, as a further explanation of his statement, Adolf Hitler declared that by Positive Christianity, he meant the Christianity of the two great Churches the Evangelical and the Roman Catholic, both of which are represented in Germany. He also called upon these Christian Churches to do everything in their power to make the moral forces of the Gospel Message effectual influences in the life of the German nation. At the same time however, he made it perfectly plain that he had nothing in common with people in bearskins" with those namely, who recalling the old Germanic tribes, would foist neo-pagan cult experiments upon the German Folk [Neo-Pagans].

On other occasions too, as for instance, in his historically remarkable speech of May 21st, 1935, the Führer emphatically rejected the godlessness of Bolshevism, contrasting it with the fact that in National Socialistic Germany the Churches have not been turned into places of secular amusement. And even if the Führer does speak on occasions such as these of a new National Socialistic Weltanschauung he means neither a new religion nor a new godlessness, but simply everything that is the result of national consciousness, of the ties of comradeship and of the heroic attitude of the National Socialistic German with respect to his mode of life, and his views of the world surrounding him. To these may be added everything needed for the reconstruction of man's inner life, and this includes in no small degree the forces of Positive Christianity....

....And just in an era of new beginnings, such as we are now experiencing, it is indeed doubly important for religious principles to be worked out on a perfectly clear basis, and in every possible direction. **For during times such as these when the inner life of a nation is in the process of being revolutionized, how easy it is for a certain confusion of mind to arise.** Whereby many a trend of thought has come to the fore that had once already existed, only however, to fall into oblivion where It has remained until now, when the auspicious moment for its re-appearance and the realization of its aims would appear to have arrived. Efforts of this kind are remarkably prevalent at the present time, and in consequence, a certain religious unrest has seized hold of our Folk, most disturbing to the peaceful reconstruction of our new Reich, leading as, it does men's minds astray, and so placing difficulties in the path of national unification.



Since this is the situation in which our spiritual life finds itself today, **it is all the more necessary to state with simple directness the real attitude adopted by National Socialism towards religion, and to consider it in detail from every point of view.** An exposition such as this however, can only be undertaken by an expert, that is to say by one who is an authority on the subject, and as a researcher has devoted himself to the work of investigating the Christian religion, in short, a theologian, and at the same time a convinced National Socialist.

It was the need for such a treatise that brought me to the fore. **I am conscious of a sense of responsibility to God and to my own conscience, both in my capacity as theological expert on confessional questions, and as an**

Evangelical Christian I felt it incumbent on me to proclaim the truth in all publicity. As an official of the State and as a political leader within the Party I am bound by a two-fold oath to the Führer of my Folk. But my religious and political duties do not clash, nor do they necessitate any inward struggle, but rather the one supplements the other, and both stand together in complete harmony. Indeed, they do even more than this: In my own life and thought, Christianity and National Socialism are closely knit together....

.... My own personal attitude therefore, gives me every right, indeed makes it my duty to publish an expert opinion on the principles of National Socialism with respect to religion. As an expert I shall adhere strictly to facts, having no intention of obtruding any personal theories or pet ideas that might tend to divert attention from the main line of thought. Rather shall I show with unwavering consistency how the attitude of National Socialism to the Christian religion as evidenced in the Party Programme, and in the Führer's own words, has been determined both by the substance of the Christian religion and by the substance of National Socialism.

.... It has been found advisable to divide the exposition itself into two main parts. The first subject of investigation to be dealt with concerns the National Socialistic policy with respect to Religion. Conclusions will thereby be drawn from the Party Programme applicable to the general attitude of the Party and the State towards Church life. In a second exposition the inner associations will be treated of, and it will be shown how the spiritual forces of Christianity must needs have a great influence in the life of the newly awakened German Folk."

Comment:

National Socialism was far more than a "political creed" or a "philosophy". It was the recipe for the spiritual rebirth of the German nation, for redemption and regeneration on a path away from the path of godlessness and wickedness that was visited upon her by the satanic forces of Judeo-Capitalism and the godless Judeo-Marxists, in the Weimar years, following World War I, and back to the German-Christian roots, morals, order, discipline, self-respect, hard work, and of community spirit and brotherly love, with neighbour helping neighbour, working together for their common good, as well as, national self-sufficiency and security. Again, who did not want that? To what lengths would they not go to stop it?



Church Sign: "God Protect Adolf Hitler"

<http://justice4germans.com/2013/08/13/free-book-positive-christianity-in-the-third-reich-by-professor-cajus-fabricius/>